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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the jury might reasonably believe that the tools were in fact "bur-
glar's tools" within the purview of the statute. It is submitted, there-
fore, that as a practical matter, the variations in wording'and inter-
pretation of the burglary statutes of the several states are really dis-
tinctions without a difference.
TORTS: THE REMEDY OF A PERSON DEFAMED ON RADIO OR TELEVISION
AGAINST HIS DEFAMER-A CRITIQUE
Basic to the Anglo-American legal system is the premise that the
common law is a flexible instrument of justice, capable of developing
to meet the needs of a society living in conditions completely different
from, and entirely unanticipated by, the society in which the law
originated.1 The capacity of the common law to grow has been seri-
ously challenged in recent years by the inventions of radio and tele-
vision and the appearance of broadcast 2 defamation cases. Whether
the common law affords the person defamed on a broadcast a remedy
against his defamer is a question which the courts have found espe-
cially difficult to answer.3 The causes of this difficulty lie in peculiar-
ities of the common law which date from 1812, when the division of
defamation into the torts of libel and slander was definitely settled
by Thorley v. Lord Kerry.4 At that time it was believed that the
distinction between the torts was a purely formal one: libel was
written, slander was oral, defamation.5 Libel, however, carried the
more serious consequences. The plaintiff in a libel suit recovered upon
showing he had been defamed, without proving damage.0 In slander,
on the other hand, unless the offensive words fit into one of several
narrow categories known as "slander per se,' 7 plaintiff was required
to prove special damage., Special damage was restricted to actual
pecuniary loss, pleaded in detail and proved precisely as pleaded.
1. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694, 27 A.L.R.2d
1250 (1951).
2. Throughout this comment, the word "broadcast" is used to denote radio and
television cases collectively.
3. This comment deals primarily with this problem. The equally intriguing
question of the liability of the broadcasting station is not considered except as
it illuminates the main issue.
4. 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
5. PRoSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955) (hereafter cited PROSSER).
6. Ibid.; 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.9 (1956) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569
(1938) (hereafter cited RESTATEMENT).
7. The categories were: imputations of serious crimes; imputations of certain
loathsome diseases; imputations affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, pro-
fession or office; and, in some jurisdictions, imputations of unchastity to women.
PROSSER § 93.
8. Ibid.; RESTATEMENT § 575.
9. McCoRRmic, DAMAGES §§ 114-15 (1935).
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Because of these peculiarities, which the modern law inherited, plain-
tiff was better off' in libel than in slander.'0
Since defamation is a tort against a person's reputation,1 the law
has always required that the defamation be "published,"'12 that is,
communicated to someone other than the person defamed. 13 Those
who publish a defamation, whether a libel,' or a slander,15 are strictly
liable even though they did not originate it. A "disseminator," on
the other hand, who merely circulates the physical embodiment of
a defamation already communicated to another,16 e.g., a newsboy, is
liable only if he has reason to know the material contains a defama-
tion,' ;.e., in the absence of due care.1s
Recently some courts have reduced the importance of the libel-
slander distinctions by partly consolidating the torts. The consoli-
dation apparently results from confusing the two meanings which
the common law of defamation assigned to the term "per se."' ' 9 The
term was used to designate those slanders actionable without proof
of special damage. In this sense, it could never be applied to libel.20
It was also applied to obviously defamatory words, such as "you
0. These arbitrary differences between libel and slander were largely the re-
sult of historical accident. Ecclesiastical courts originally had jurisdiction over
all defamation. When common law courts wrested this jurisdiction from the
church courts, printing was rare and writing beyond the capability of the aver-
age non-cleric. Most defamations handled by the law courts were therefore oral.
During the period when jurisdiction over defamation was moving from one court
to the other, damage rather than insult became the gist of the action, which
could not be maintained without proof of injury. The law courts did presume
damage in certain instances, but merely as expedients for further extending theirjurisdiction at the expense of the church tribunals. These expedients later de-
velored into the categories of "slander per se." Meanwhile with the spread of
pi intin-, the Star Chamber was given jurisdiction over libel, which was a crime
as well as a tort. Breach of the peace was the gist of the action and a showing
of inju y was not required. When the law courts assumed jurisdiction over libel
upon the abolition of the Star Chamber, they tended to keep it separated from
their older action of slander. Thus, by 1812,*it was established that slander was
01-al defamation requiring proof of special damage, except in certain narrow
areas, while libel was written defamation requiring no showing of injury.
Thce above paragraph is substantially a paraphrase of RESTATEMENT § 568,
comment b. The definitive work on the historical background of defamation is
Van Vechten Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLuAT.L.. Ruv., 546 (1903).
For a view that the law of defamation was not the result of historical acei-
,dent, see Cardozo, J. in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506
( 1) :" "The schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander
and the newer one of libel is not the product of mere accident .... It has its
genesis in evils which the years have not erased."
11. RESTATEMENT § 559; PROSSER § 92; 1 H.%RPE & JAMES, TORTS § 5.1 (1956).
12. RESTATEMENT § 5,8.
13. Id. § ,577, comment b; PRossER § 92.
14. RESTATEMENT § 578, comment b.
15. Id. § 578, comment c.
16. Id. § 1581, comment e.
17. d. § 581.
18. See PRossEn § 94, at 604-05.
19. Id. § 93, at 588; MCCORMICK, DALAGES § 113, at 417-19 (1935).
20. See text supported by notes 6-8 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
robber," to distinguish them from words which were defamatory only
when extrinsic facts became known. 21 In the latter sense, "per se"
could be applied to both libel and slander. The confusion apparently
began with a holding that if a libel was not defamatory "per se"-
that is, not defamatory on its face-special damage would have to be
proved.22 This misapplication of the rule governing slanders action-
able only upon proof of special damage to libels not defamatory on
their face has been adopted by a majority of courts that have con-
sidered the question,23 although the extent of the resulting consoli-
dation varies.24 In some states all defamations require a showing of
special damage unless they fall into the narrow common law cate-
gories of slander actionable without such damage. 2
After the division into libel and slander in 1812, the common law
encountered new modes of defamation. These innovations were ab-
sorbed without apparent difficulty and generally were characterized
as libel. Thus it was held libellous to use signs2 or pictures27 to
humiliate plaintiff; to burn his effigy ;28 to dishonor his valid check ;29
and to "shadow" him in an obvious manner. 30 Hanging a red lantern
at the front door of the home of respectable women has been held
libel. 1 This expansion of libel to include more than writing and
printing invalidated the traditional oral-written distinction and
scholars began groping for another to replace it. For a time it was
thought that libel was communicated by sight and slander by sound 2
The collapse of this test 33 led to the formulation of two others which
live today alongside the early oral-written test. The new formulations
are not "tests" in the strict sense that they pretend to separate the
cases on some definite, inflexible basis. Rather, they are only factors
21. Am example of words which become defamatory only when extrinsic facts
are known is a newspaper item reading, "John and Mary Jones are the parents
of a son born yesterday," when John and Mary Jones have been married only a
month.
22. See authorities cited in note 19 supra.
23. PRoSSER § 93, at 588.
24. Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 874, 889-91
(1956).
25. Ibid.
26. Haylock v. Sparke, 1 El. & B1. 471 (1853).
27. Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936); DuBost v.
Beresford, 2 Camp. 511 (1810).
28. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 Atl. 425 (Pa. 1888).
29. Svendsen v. State Bank of Duluth, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086, 31 L.R.A.
552 (1896).
30. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis.
537, 139 N.W. 386, 43 L.R.A. (n.s.) 520 (1913).
31. Jefferies v. Duncombe, 11 East 226, 103 Eng. Rep. 991 (1809).
32. PRossEa § 93, at 586. For anachronistic codifications of this distinction,
see CALIF. CIVIL CODE §§ 45, 46 (Deering 1949); MONT. REV. CODE § 64-203
(1953) ;.OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1441 (1937).
33. A mute defaming another by sign language would be perpetrating slander.
PROSSER § 93, at 586.
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to be considered by the court in deciding whether a given defamation
constitutes libel or slander.", The first test classifies any defamation
embodied in a permanent form as libel.3 5 The second distinguishes the
torts by the magnitude of the potential harm, or the area of dis-
semination."'
By a coincidence, widespread recognition was being accorded the
new tests at roughly the same time that radio defamation cases first
reached the courts. 7 This simultaneous appearance of a development
in the law and a development in mass communication is one of the
reasons the courts had difficulty with broadcast defamation. Radio
can reach an audience of millions and can cause untold harm if used
to circulate defamatory remarks. On the other hand, the words are
unquestionably conveyed by voice, and they may or may not be em-
bodied in some permanent form. For example, at least three types
of defamatory programs can be imagined: (1) the program may
follow a script containing the defamation; (2) the performer may
deviate from a prepared script and suddenly inject the defamation,
or; (3) the program may be spontaneous, e.g., an interview, and the
defamation may be uttered extemporaneously. In addition, any of
the three types may or may not be recorded. As might be expected,
given so many variables, case holdings have not been consistent. In
radio cases three courts have held's and two more have indicated-9
.34. RESTATEMENT § 568, comments d and g.
35. Id. § 568(1).
.36. Id. § 568(3); PROSSER § 93, at 596.
It is at least plausible that these new formulations are really functions of each
other rather than distinct criteria because their purpose fails when they are not
used together. For example, a defamatory book may cause very little injury
whereas a defamatory remark over the radio may be greatly damaging. If one
or the other criterion-but not both-is applied to the two cases supposed, anom-
alous results may be reached, viz., the book may be libellous and the person de-
famed able to recover even though he has not been injured, while the person de-
famed over the radio may be barred from recovery because of inability to prove
the damage he actually suffered. This probably would have been the result under
the old common law. PROSSER § 92, at 572. Aberrations like this gave added im-
petus to the movement for reformulating the distinction between libel and slander.
12 ALI PROCEEDINGS 345-55 (1935). Notice, too, that it is sometimes the perma-
nence of form which makes the area of dissemination great, as in the supposed
case of the book.
The criteria have been separated here for ease of analysis and because some
courts, at least, treat them as independent. See Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877,
883-84, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 192 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Developments in the Law-Def-
amation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 874, 888 (1956).
37. This is a surmise of the writer based upon the following facts: the Ameri-
can Law Institute discussed the tests at its 1935 meeting, ALl PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 36; they were important enough to be incorporated in the Restatement of
Torts § 568, in 1938; the first radio defamation case was decided in 1932, Soren-
son v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098.
38. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955); Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); Sorenson v.
Wood, supra note 37.
39. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950);
Polakoff v. Hill, 261 App. Div. 777, 27 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1st Dept. 1941).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/6
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that reading defamation from a script is libel. An Australian court
held it slander 40 and two American courts have indicated they would
agree with this.41 One dissenting judge urged that a new tort be
created.42 One court has held a defamatory deviation from a script
slander,43 another has so stated in dictum, 44 a third has held it a new
tort,45 while two others have indicated it would be libel.
4
This confusion may be partly explainable by the fact that three
of the earliest radio defamation cases, from which much of the later
law was drawn, involved the station's liability rather than the
speaker's. In the landmark case of Sorenson v. Wood 7 for example,
the question was whether the trial court had properly predicated the
liability of the station on negligence. In holding the station strictly
liable, the court did not discuss at length what the tort should be,
but simply stated, "The underlying basis for liability is libel, and
not negligent conduct." 411 The offensive words were read from a script,
but whether this was the basis of the court's decision is not known.
In spite of the holding, one is led to believe that the basis of the
defamer's liability was all but forgotten, because the court's argu-
ments were focused on the question of the station's liability. Simi-
larly Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co. 49 involved the liability of a
Missouri radio station for a defamatory remark uttered in a broad-
cast originating in New York. The court held the station strictly
liable, even though it "assumed" the defamation had been interpolated
without fault of the station. The court borrowed an analogy from
the Sorenson case and likened the station to a newspaper, which is
held strictly liable as a publisher.50 The Coffey case illustrates another
means by which confusion has crept into the law. The case is usually
cited for the proposition that broadcast defamation is libel, although
all the court explicitly decided was that the station was strictly liable.
40. Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., [1932] Vict. L. Rep. 425.
41. Lynch v. Lyons, 313 Mass. 116, 20 N.E.2d 953 (1939); Miles v. Louis
Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
42. Wachenfeld, J. in Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 702, 61 A.2d 143, 147,
5 A.L.R.2d 951 (1948).
43. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
44. Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (libel if read
from script, however; see note 38 supra).
45. Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
46. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938); Coffey v. Midland
Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
No radio cases involving extemporaneous defamatory remarks uttered during
the course of spontaneous broadcasts have been found, nor any cases which rest
their decisions on whether the broadcast was recorded.
47. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932).
48. Id. at 353, 243 N.W. at 85.
49. 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
50. E.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260, 10 A.L.R.
662 (1920).
51. E.g., PossER § 93, at 586 n.72.
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It appears, then, that some courts desiring to impose strict liability
upon stations will hold the tort libel in order to do so,52 while, con-
versely, any court which imposes strict liability will be interpreted
as having held the defamation to be libel. It appears to have been
overlooked that liability is also strict for publishing a slander. 3 These
fallacies can be seen working in reverse in Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC,54
in which the question was the liability of the network for a defama-
tory deviation from a prepared script. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the newspaper analogy, saying it would be
harsh to impose strict liability for a defamation which no amount of
care could have prevented. The court also rejected a suggestion that
the tort be classified as libel, but that the network be held liable only
as a disseminator, viz., for lack of due care.55 Instead, the court held
that the tort, if any, was an entirely new one and dismissed the case.
Thus the person uttering the defamatory remark was given the
benefit of the confusion surrounding a new tort because the court
considered it unfair to impose strict liability upon the network, and
could not bring itself to treat the network as a disseminator2 6
Before the advent of television, defamatory movies had been held
libellous"' because the sound track "accompanies and is identified with
the film itself."," In spite of this rather clear lead, the few television
cases show the same split as in radio. Two courts have held that
extemporaneous remarks made during a spontaneous program are
libel- and one has held them slander.O
In recent years, the importance of the question whether broadcast
52. See the quotation from the Sorenson case at note 48 mzpra. See also Kelly
v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 702, 61 A.2d 143, 147, 5 A.L.R.2d 951 (1948): "The
doctrine of so-called absolute responsibility can only be invoked by the applica-
tion of the law of libel to broadcast defamation."
53. See text supported by note 15 supra.
54. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
55. See text supported by notes 16-18 supra.
The suggestion was first made in a student note, 32 CoLuss. L. RER,. 1255(1932), and was later supported by Professor Bohlen in 50 Years of Torts, 50
HARV. L. REv. 725, 731 (1937).
56. The court felt the network played too active a part in the broadcast to be
anything but a publisher if the law of defamation was to apply. 336 Pa. at 193,
8 A.2d at 309. Thus, the court refused to apply the law of defamation because,
as a matter of policy, it would be unfair to the network. But when a method for
applying the law of defamation without imposing strict liability was suggested,
the court rejected it because, as a matter of strict precedent, the network was
not a disseminator.
57. E.g., Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp.
544 (1st Dept. 1934).
58. PROSSER § 93, at 586.
59. Shor v. Billingsley, 4 M.2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Sargent
v. NBC, 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Calif. 1955). The Sargent case is apparently
based on a misapprehension of New York law, however, since it cites Hartmann
v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) for the proposition that ex-
temporaneous remarks are libel. See notes 38 and 44 supra.
60. Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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defamation should be libel or slander has diminished. Some states,
as noted, have consolidated the torts.61 Six others have answered the
question by statute: four classify it as libel62 and two as slander. 3
At least thirty-nine states relieve radio and television stations from
liability for defamatory broadcasts, most of them imposing liability
only in the absence of due care.6 4 Decisions on the question of the tort
committed by the defamer should no longer be influenced by policy
arguments on the station's strict liability where these statutes are
in effect,615 although this error is still made today.6
Numerous proposals for handling broadcast defamation have been
made. It has been urged that all radio defamation be slander07 Radio
stations and defamers both would benefit by this rule because the
plaintiff would be required in many cases to prove special damage.
The usual argument for the proposal is that the listener does not
know that the words are being read from a script.6 8 There are two
objections to the argument. First, it assumes that there was a logical
basis at common law for distinguishing libel from slander when in
fact the distinction was arbitrary. 9 There seems to be no reason
why an arbitrary classification of slander is to be preferred over an
arbitrary classification of libel. Even more important is the fact that
the common law, which early held that reading aloud from a printed
document was libel,70 never held it significant that the hearer might
not know the words were being read. This recommendation achieves
its ends only by importing a distinction that the common law, to
which it appeals, never made.
61. See text supported by note 25 supra.
62. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 404.1 (Supp. 1956); ME. REv. STAT. c. 130, § 32
(1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.410 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.58.010 (1952).
Illinois seems definitely to have made up its mind. In 1945, sections entitled
"Slander by Radio" were deleted and a cross-reference to the above was inserted.
63. CALIF. CIvM CODE § 46 (Deering 1949); N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2815 (1943).
What California is going to do with television is problematical since it has de-
fined libel as "a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture,
effigy or other fixed representation to the eye .... " Id. § 45. And see note 32
supra"
64. Note 9 OKLA. L. REV. 103 (1956). See also Reuners, Recent Legislative
Trends in befamation by Radio, 64 HARv. L. REv. 727 (1951); Note, 42 VA. L.
REv. 63 (1956).
65. Indeed, some legislatures have spelled this out by inserting a provision
that the § relieving the station of liability is not to be applied to the speaker.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.64.020 (1952).
66. "To classify all radio defamation as libel invokes too great a burden on
the broadcast station." 1 WARNER, RADmo & TELEVISION LAW § 37, at 449 (1953).
67. E.g., Sprague, Freedom of the Air, 8 Ala L. REV. 30 (1937). These pro-
posals antedated television.
68. Id. at 43; Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 63, 74 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1938).
The argument concerning the listener's ignorance was neatly disposed of in
Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947).
69. PRossmn § 93, at 595; McCoRMICK, DAMiAGES § 113 at 416-19 (1935). See
note 10 supra.
70. E.g., Miller v. Donovan, 16 Misc. 453, 39 N.Y. Supp. 820 (Sup. Ct. 1896);
see PRossna § 93, at 598.
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Two courts have stated that broadcast defamation is libel when
read from a script but slander when extemporaneous.71 This rule is
open to criticism on two points.7 First, it is a reversion to the
practice of deciding the issue solely on the basis of form. It was
partly to eliminate purely formal distinctions that the new tests were
formulated23 As modern writers say, "[N]o respectable authority
has ever attempted to justify the [common law] distinction on prin-
ciple,"'  and "the reasons that have been given for [it] have been
offered in explanation rather than in justification. ' ' 7  A return to
the old common law at this date hardly seems apt. Secondly, both
this rule and the proposal to classify all broadcast defamation as
slander are unable to cope properly with television, which is capable
of purely visual defamations, such as a sign in the background: 6 Any
rule formulated in terms of "reading from a script" would be useless
in such a case.-
Writers have contended that (1) the common law ought to be
overhauled using broadcast defamation as an excuse and a means78
or (2) that broadcast defamation, being unlike anything encountered
by the common law, ought to be placed in a category of its own.79
The second suggestion was followed in the Summit Hotel case, and
has been echoed in a dissenting opinion.80 Dean Prosser, who suggests
71. Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (television);
Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (radio). Many other
courts have accepted one side of the proposition or the other. See notes 38, 39
and 43 Nupra.
72. The argument in support of classifying all broadcast defamation as
slander, viz., that the listener does not know the words are being read, can be
turned around and used to support the contention that it ought all to be libel.
Since the common law always held reading from printed material libel, could it
not be contended that all broadcast defamation ought to be libel because the
listener does not know whether the words are being read?
73. See notes 34-36 supr, and text supported thereby.
What we have done in [§ 568] (3) is to attempt to avoid this arbitrary
distinction between libel and slander and leave it for the courts to decide,
only pointing out the factors which have in fact been regarded as important
in making the distinction and let the law grow as it will along lines that
we think are sound.
12 ALI PROCEEDINGS 348 (1935).
74. RESTATEMENT § 568, comment b.
75. PROSSER § 93, at 595.
76. Cf. Landau v. CBS, 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
77. It would seem that the added element of visual presentation ought to
make a difference between television and radio when purely formal distinctions
are used. But see to the contrary Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949).
78. PROSSER § 93, at 587.
79. 2 SOCOLow, RADIO BROADCASTING § 468 (1939); Leflar, Radio and TV Defa-
,nation: "Fault" or Strict Liability?, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 252, 261 (1954) ("assumed
necessity" of classifying as libel or slander); Newhouse, Defamation by Radio:
A New Tort, 17 ORE. L. Rnv. 314 (1938).
80. Wachenfeld, J. in Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 702, 61 A.2d 143, 147,
5 A.L.R.2d 951 (1948). What Justice Wachenfeld had in mind is unclear, how-
ever, because he also was in favor of imposing strict liability on the station
and the speaker.
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that courts use broadcast defamation to reorganize the rules of defa-
mation, is nonetheless dissatisfied with the present consolidation of
libel and slander.,' This may be disappointment because the con-
solidation rests upon an elementary mistake or because libel is being
incorporated into slander rather than vice versa. 2 The second sug-
gestion, creating a new tort, has the attraction of intellectual novelty,
but raises far more questions than it answers, and is open to numer-
ous criticisms. First, what are the elements of the new tort and who
is to define them, the courts or the legislatures? Secondly, it implicitly
ignores the development of defamation between the year 1812 and
the advent of radio. Why radio and television are any. more novel
than sound movies, which the common law absorbed without diffi-
culty, 3 is not readily apparent.8 4 Third, it is one thing to dismiss
a suit on the ground that a claimed cause of action does not exist,
but quite another to dismiss an established cause of action on the
ground that a different one, not then extant, is the proper remedy.
The action of the Pennsylvania court in the Summit Hotel case in this
respect was quite unusual.85 Fourth, it would appear undesirable to
recommend a new tort when many writers agree there is already one
tort too many. 6 Finally, the suggestion fails to recognize that some
jurisdictions consistently refuse to adopt new causes of action. The
most recent novel action, invasion of privacy,87 furnishes an excellent
case history. First adopted by a court in 1905,88 invasion of privacy
has since been recognized as a tort in twenty-three jurisdictions.D
But without legislation, the courts in at least four states continue to
reject it. ° The antipathy of some courts to new causes of action is
81. PROSSER § 93, at 588. -See text supported by notes 19-25 supra.
82. This is the feeling expressed in the most recent treatise on the subject. 1
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.9, at 373 n.9 (1956).
83. See text supported by notes 57-58 supra.
84. Mr. Socolow at § 468 of his treatise, op. cit. supra note 79, implies that
the line of cases which led to the original breakdown of the oral-written distinc-
tion (see text at notes 26-36 supra) were red herrings. "Liability for defamation
by conduct is superimposed as a convenience upon the law of libel to which it
has no historic relation whatsoever." However, it is not clear why it was "con-
venient" to hold the dishonoring of a valid check, for example, to be libel, nor
why it would be "inconvenient" to treat radio defamation under the common law
of defamation.
85. The court rationalized its action on the ground that all defamation actions
in Pennsylvania are laid in trespass. It is submitted, however, that this offers
little assistance to a plaintiff who wants to know what he must plead and what
he must prove.
86. "Nowhere is the layman's criticism and the cry, 'kill all the lawyers first,'
more thoroughly justified." PRoSSER § 93, at 595.
87. The "right of privacy" was first delineated in a law review article. Warren
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
88. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A.
101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (1905); PROSSER § 97; 1 HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS § 9.6 (1956).
89. 1 id. § 9.6, at 682.
90. PROSSER § 97, at 637.
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well illustrated by the appalling decision in Yoeckel V. Samonig.91 In
that case, defendant, a man, took a picture of the plaintiff in the
women's rest room, and the Wisconsin court denied recovery on the
ground that the right of privacy "does not exist in this state."
It is the opinion of the writer that all broadcast defamation should
be classified as libel. The libel classification recognizes the immense
potential of harm inherent in broadcast defamation. It also recognizes
that the interest in reputation is substantial. This interest is probably
more important today than it formerly was because of the careful
investigations that precede employment, admission to schools, and
licensing in the learned professions. Some publishers seem to be
unmoved by the increased significance of reputation in the contem-
porary scene and there seems to be no reason why these persons
should be benefited by the arbitrary and anachronistic rules govern-
ing slander. A number of opposing arguments have been offered
however. It has been said that holding broadcast defamation libellous
"does not consider . . . the traditional belief in the veracity of the
printed word." ' Perhaps there was once a time when the mass of
people revered the printed word because of their own illiteracy,9z but
it is doubtful that such reverence exists today. It has also been said
that holding all broadcast defamation libellous ignores the perma-
nency of form criterion 14 used to distinguish libel from slander95
But the criteria of permanency of form and magnitude of the harm
(or area of dissemination) must be used together in making a deter-
minationO'  and to let the formal one control is to revert to the common
law.'- It is submitted that Professor Donnelley was correct when
he wrote:
The primary reason assigned by the courts from time to time tojustify the imposition of broader liability for libel than for
slander has been the greater capacity for harm than [sic; that]
a writing is assumed to have because of the wide range of dis-
aemination made possible by its permanency of form. When
account is taken of the vast and far flung audience reached by
1. 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
.)2. Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 199, 8 A.2d 302, 308 (1939).
93. POssER § 93, at 585.
94. See text supported by note 35 supra.
95. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 894, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 192 (Sup. Ct.
1937) ; Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 199, 8 A.2d 302, 308 (1939).
96. See note 36 supra.
97. See text at note 73 supra.
No cases have been found which dwelt on the fact that the broadcast was re-
corded although this fact has been pleaded in at least one case. Remington v.
Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Yet it would seem that if permanence
of form were the main criterion, a recording would satisfy it. Cf. Ostrowe v.
Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). It is believed the courts properly ignore
technicalities such as recordings and films, however. See Vold, Defamatory Inter-
polations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 249, 259-63 (1940).
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radio, it is clear that the broadcast of defamatory utterances are
as potentially harmful to the defamed person's reputation as a
publication by writing. Radio makes available to the defamer a
simultaneous audience far greater than that reached by the most
permanent of writings. The distinction of permanence between
radio and newspaper dissemination seems comparatively irrele-
vant considered from the standpoint of ultimate distribution of
the defamatory material.98
If it is objected that this, too, is an arbitrary classification, it can
be answered that it at least is based on policy rather than form.
98. Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IOWA L. REv. 12,
17-18 (1948).
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